A Contractual Anonymity System

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Motivating Example

RateMyProf.com

Uh oh. I wis hadn't happe	sh this ened	User Comments Professors add your rebuttal here s one of the most charismatic instructors I've ever had. She is engaging and keeps class interesting. She makes an effort to truly know all of her students. She is a gifted and committed teacher. Shanita's lessons extend far beyond the classroom. I am grateful to have had class with her.	
Student	12/10/07 4 5 5 5 🥥 🕕 🗸	She is my favorite prof. She is fun, insightful, and very encouraging. I liked everything about the dass except the fact she had some people come into dass that were a waste of time but it was still a good dass. at least i found out what I want to do w/ my major b/c of this dass	a lot ed her to
	6/1/07 5 5 5 3 🥥 🕕	Although I felt like this class was a little bit suited for kids at time (you play a lot of games and group activities) it was easy and interesting, plus Shanita always energetic and willing to help you!	
	5/22/07 5 5 5 5 🥥 🔒	I had for Intro to Advertising. She is a great teacher. One that has a lot of energy, engages her students, and inspires. The way her class is structured is interesting as well. She gives us feedback and other classmates give feedback for your project/presentation. She is more fair than any of the other instructors in the department.	
	12/26/06 5 1 1 3 🛞 🕕	I was embarrassed to be in this class. It felt like kindergarden. I coudin't believe I wasted tuition \$ on it. We sat around in circles and drew pictures to put on the walls. If this is college - I was prepared before elementary school. An embarrassment, insulting to our intellegence. A joke, llearned nothing at	
		wasted a lot of money.	Professor
This c bori	lass is ng!!!	Student, you are in BIG trouble.	

What properties will help Student share his thoughts?

Anonymity?



Anonymity



How can we help Student share his thoughts?

Anonymity



Linkability



UNLinkability



How can we help Student share his thoughts?

- Anonymity
- Unlinkability



Problems with Anonymity



3/2/2010

How can we help Student share his thoughts?

- Anonymity
- Unlinkability
- Revocability

• Prior work can provide these properties

 Group signatures allow a user in a group to endorse a message on behalf of the entire group

• Each signature is anonymous and unlinkable

• There is a **group manager** that can determine which user signed a message

Background: Group signatures



Group Signature Anonymity Protocol

• How to make an anonymity protocol from group signatures

Setup

- Group manager is an arbitrator
- Users join group by sending long-term identity to arbitrator

Message sending

- Example: Student wants to send a rating
- He creates a group signature
- RateMyProf verifies group signature

Revocation

- Example: User posts review full of links (spam)
- SP sends offending message to arbitrator
- Arbitrator can look up offender's long-term identity

Group Signature Anonymity: Why Does it Work?



Group Signature Anonymity: Problem



Group Signature Anonymity: Problem

- We trusted the arbitrator, but didn't have any reason to
 - User can be de-anonymized and banned at a whim
- Can it be fixed?
 - Yes, if we can constrain the arbitrator somehow
 - Foreshadow: We will do this for our scheme using trusted computing

How can we help Student share his thoughts?

- Anonymity
- Unlinkability
- Revocability
- Verifiability

• Prior work can provide this too

Subjective Judgment Schemes

- Examples: PEREA [Tsang et al. 08], EPID [Brickell et al. 08], BLAC [Tsang et al. 07]
- No third party
- Service Provider judges bad behavior
- Allows anonymous blacklisting
 - Blacklist means ban from service
- Performance concerns
 - Scalability with number of banned users (more later)



Subjective Judgment: Problem





How can we help Student share his thoughts?

- Anonymity
- Unlinkability
- Revocability
- Verifiability
- Accessibility
- Prior work **cannot** provide this!

Guaranteeing Access by Defining Policy First



Motivating Example

RateMyProfs.com





How can we help Student share his thoughts?

- Anonymity
- Unlinkability
- Revocability
- Verifiability
- Accessibility

- What I described is Contractual Anonymity
 - Obey policy and get anonymity/access
 - Don't obey policy and don't get anonymity/access

- Strong guarantees
 - User can not be banned on a whim
 - User can not be de-anonymized on a whim
- We design and implement the first contractual anonymity protocol, **RECAP**

- Background: Trusted Computing
- Design of RECAP (protocol for achieving contractual anonymity)
- Implementation
- Measurements
- Conclusion

Group signature scheme was insufficient because we trusted a third party without reason

- We can make the third party a program constrained by trusted computing
 - Trusted computing can remotely convince user that their identity is only handled by trusted code with known behavior
 - We call this program the **accountability server**

• Attestation

Conveys information about what software is running

Sealed storage

- Allows a program to keep data secret while it is not running

Hardware-assisted isolation

- Allows a program to keep data secret while it is running
- Greatly reduces Trusted Computing Base (TCB)
- For RECAP: Remotely convince user and SP how third party will operate
 - Only reveals identity if user violates policy

• The AS is constrained to enforce a **policy**

Policies define bad behavior

- Any function f: Message(s) -> {Good,Bad}
- Examples
 - Pattern matching
 - E.g., swearing, spam, known malware
 - Designate authority to digital signature private key
 - Group voting/self-moderation

RECAP Protocol

• Setup

- Group manager is the Accountability Server
- Users join group by sending long-term identity to AS and agreeing to policy

Message sending

- Example: Student wants to send a rating
- He creates a group signature
- RateMyProf verifies group signature

Revocation

- Example: User posts review full of links (spam)
- SP sends offending message to AS
- AS can look up offender's long-term identity only if policy(messages) returns bad

Why Does It Work?



Implementation of Protocols

• **Message sending** is group signature generation/verification

Setup/Revocation

- Require special secure channel
 - Established between keys demonstrated to be known only to trusted code
 - Uses trusted computing
 - Protocols are straightforward after channel setup
- Secure channel and protocols detailed in paper

Trusted computing

- Uses Flicker system [McCune et al. 08] for trusted computing
 - Runs on commodity PC hardware
- Long term identities are unique trusted computing identifiers
 - No need to register in person, etc.

Group signatures

- Uses group signature scheme of [Boneh and Shacham BS04]
- Tradeoff: Complete unlinkability xor O(1) operations
 - We choose: small fraction (~1/1024) of messages linkable and O(1) operations
 - Optional choice in group signature implementation

Message Sending Throughput at the User



• PEREA/BLAC numbers from their paper

of Banned Users

3/2/2010

- RECAP has short message sending time

 Takes about 0.1s for user and SP, O(1) wrt size of blacklist
- The registration protocol and revocation protocol takes approximately 8.0s, but happen rarely
 - -And, we know how to make them faster

- AS RECAP Code: 3000 lines
- Crypto/Drivers: 32000 lines
- This is the entire Trusted Computing Base



- We propose **contractual anonymity**
 - Balances anonymity & accountability
- We implement the first contractual anonymity protocol, **RECAP**
- RECAP makes two primary contributions
 - RECAP has high throughput
 - RECAP does not allow users to be blacklisted without reason

Questions?

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